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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether, under former U.C.A. § 78-27-37 (1973), applicable to 
this action, the trial Court properly instructed the jury that 
the negligence of appellant's decedent should be compared to that 
of the respondents for purposes of determining liability and 
damages. 
2. Whether the trial Court erred in ruling that the siblings of 
Darin Kelson could not recover damages under Utah's Wrongful 
Death Act. 
3. Whether the trial Court abused its discretion in refusing to 
grant appellant relief from a Stipulation concerning the alleged 
blood alcohol content of Darin Kelson at the time of his death. 
These issues were all briefed and argued several times before 
the trial Court. Judge Murphy instructed the jury that Darin 
Kelson's negligence should be compared to that of defendants. 
The jury subsequently apportioned liability 25% to defendant 
Buckner and 75% to Darin Kelson, on which basis the Court entered 
its judgment NO CAUSE OF ACTION. The Court also ruled, as a 
matter of law that the siblings of Darin Kelson were not entitled 
to recover for his wrongful death; and permitted the Stipulation 
complained of to be read into evidence. 
1 
The issues presented on appeal are all questions of law which 
may be resolved by this Court without reference to transcripts of 
the pleadings below. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
1. Former Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 (1973, repealed 1986), 
provided: 
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE - DIMINISHMENT OF DAMAGES - "CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE" INCLUDES "ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK." 
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action 
by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for 
negligence or gross negligence resulting in death or in injury to 
person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the 
negligence or gross negligence of the person against whom 
recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished 
in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the 
person recovering. As used in this Act, "contributory 
negligence" includes "assumption of the risk." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves a wrongful death action brought by 
Darrell Kelson, as personal representative of the heirs of Darin 
Kelson, against Salt Lake County and Police Officer Perry 
Buckner. The matter was tried to a jury with Judge Michael R. 
Murphy, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, presiding. On 
2 
January 29, 1987, the jury returned a Special Verdict finding 
that the conduct of both Buckner and Kelson proximately caused 
the death. The fault was attributed 25% to Buckner and 75% to 
Kelson. Having previously ruled that the negligence of 
appellant's decedent should be compared to that of respondents, 
judgment for respondents was duly entered on February 4, 1987. 
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES ON REVIEW 
A. With Respect To The Contributory Negligence Issue: 
1. The heirs of Darin Kelson did not cause or contribute to 
the cause of his death in any way. 
2. Nevertheless, the trial Court instructed the jury that 
the negligence, if any, of Darin Kelson should be compared to 
that of respondents in determining whether, and what amount 
of damages could be recovered by his parents. (See, 
Instruction Nos. 32 and 33 attached hereto as Exhibit A.) 
3. The Special Verdict Form also required the jury to 
determine the percentage of Darin Kelson's negligence and 
compare it to that of respondents as a prerequisite to 
determining damages. (See, the Special Verdict attached 
hereto as Exhibit E.) 
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B. With Respect To The Blood Alcohol Stipulation Issue: 
1. Appellant was or iginal ly represented by Robert DeBry and 
Associates. 
2. Mr. DeBry, without a p p e l l a n t ' s a u t h o r i z a t i o n or 
permission, t ransferred the case to Robert B. Hansen. 
3. From the outset of h is "representat ion" of appel lant , 
Mr. Hansen was an t agon i s t i c and argumentative with the 
appellant concerning the case. 
4. Mr. Hansen was t o l d repeatedly and con t inua l ly by 
appel lant and h is family tha t Darin Kelson had not been 
dr inking and was not in tox ica ted at the time of the 
c o l l i s i o n . The family wanted tha t issue l i t i g a t e d to the 
fu l les t extent . fSee, l e t t e r dated July 2 6, 1985, from Robert 
Hansen to Darrell Kelson attached hereto as Exhibit C . Note 
that no disclosure of the Stipulation is made there in . ] 
5. Nevertheless, on February 19, 1985, Mr. Hansen, without 
the knowledge, consent or authorizat ion of h is c l i e n t s , and 
in fact agains t the express d i r e c t i o n s of h i s c l i e n t s , 
entered into a St ipulat ion, the effect of which was to admit 
t h a t Darin Kelson was in tox ica ted at the time of the 
c o l l i s i o n . fSee. Affidavits of Robert Hansen and Darrel l 
Kelson, attached hereto as Exhibits D &E .] 
6. Mr. Hansen received absolutely nothing in exchange for 
the St ipulat ion. 
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7. Because appellant was concerned about Mr. Hansen's 
"representation", Darrell Kelson sent a letter to Mr. Hansen 
on April 25, 1985, instructing Mr. Hansen to do nothing on 
the case without his express permission. Even though the 
Stipulation had been executed at the time, Mr. Hansen did not 
inform appellant of its existence or its impact on the case. 
rsee, letter attached hereto as Exhibit F. ] 
8. Mr. Hansen withdrew from the case on August 21, 1985, 
without disclosing the existence of the Stipulation to 
appellant. 
9. Appellant then learned that Mr. Hansen had never 
performed any substantive work on the case. After nearly a 
year on the matter, Mr. Hansen wanted to bill appellant for 
the three hours of work he had done on the case, rsee, letter 
from Robert Hansen to Darrell Kelson dated August 26, 1985, 
attached as Exhibit G.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Comparative Negligence Statute applicable to this action, 
U.C.A., § 78-27-37 (1973, repealed 1986), provides in relevant 
part: 
[A]ny damages allowed shall be diminished 
in proportion to the amount of negligence 
attributable to the person recovering. 
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Under this unambiguous language, the damages recoverable by a 
decedent's heirs in a wrongful death action can not be diminished 
by any negligence attributable to the decedent. 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has unequivocally held that 
an action for wrongful death brought by or on behalf of a 
decedent's heirs is not derivative to an action which is or could 
be brought by the decedent or his estate. Hull v. Silver, 577 
P.2d 103, 104 (Utah 1978). In every jurisdiction that has ruled 
on the issue, those with non-derivative actions have held that 
damages recoverable by a decedent's heirs cannot be diminished by 
any percentage of negligence attributable to the decedent. 
During pre-trial motions, the Court ruled that Darin Kelson's 
siblings were not eligible to recover damages under the Utah 
wrongful death statute. The only justification for this position 
is a literal application of the term "heirs" found in the Probate 
Code, which is totally irrelevant to a wrongful death action. 
Moreover, it is illogical to deny damages to persons resulting 
from the wrongful death of an immediate family member. 
Finally, the trial judge refused to grant appellant relief 
from a Stipulation concerning the alleged blood alcohol content 
of Darin Kelson at the time of the collision. The Stipulation 
was executed by former counsel without appellant's knowledge, 
consent or authorization. It involves the single most damaging 
piece of "evidence" presented by the respondents. Under the 
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circumstances, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial Court 
to admit the Stipulation and constituted prejudicial reversible 
error. 
ARGUMENT 
I . THE T R I A L COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE NEGLIGENCE OF 
APPELLANT'S DECEDENT DARIN KELSON, SHOULD BE COMPARED WITH 
THAT OF RESPONDENTS IN A WRONGFUL DEATH CASE. 
At t r i a l , t h e j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d t h a t u n d e r U t a h ' s 
Comparat ive Negl igence Act , t h e n e g l i g e n c e of Dar in Kelson shou ld 
be compared t o t h a t of r e s p o n d e n t s i n d e t e r m i n i n g l i a b i l i t y and 
d a m a g e s . Tha t i n s t r u c t i o n was c o n t r a r y t o t h e law and 
c o n s t i t u t e d r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . 
A. The Language Of Former Q.C.A. § 78 -27 -37 Unambiguously 
P r o h i b i t s Damages Awarded A D e c e d e n t ' s H e i r s In A Wrongful Death 
Action To Be Diminished By The Proportion Of The Decedent's 
Negligence. 
Utah's Comparative Negligence Statute1 passed in 1973 s t a t e s 
unequivocally tha t "any damages allowed shal l be diminished in 
proportion to the amount of negligence a t t r ibutable to the person 
1
 The S t a t u t e was repea led in 1986. However, s ince the events t h a t a re the 
sub jec t of t h i s appeal occurred in 1983, the former s t a t u t e a p p l i e s . Note 
however, t h a t even the presen t § 78-27-38 (1986) p rov ides : "The f au l t of the 
person seeking recovery s h a l l not alone bar recovery by t h a t person. He may 
recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose f au l t exceeds h i s own. 
[Emphasis added.] 
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recovering." In this case the persons recovering are the heirs 
of Darin Kelson, his parents. They were not negligent, and their 
recovery cannot, under the plain language of the statute, be 
diminished by the negligence of someone else. 
B. Recovery Qf Damages By Heirs In A Wrongful Death Action 
Cannot Be Reduced By The Proportion Of Negligence Attributable To 
A Decedent In Jurisdictions Which Hold That Such Actions Are Non-
Derivative. 
1. The Utah Supreme Court Has Held That Wrongful Death 
Actions Are Not Der iva t ive . 
In Hull v . S i l v e r , 577 P.2d 103, 104 (Utah 1978) , 2 t he Utah 
Supreme Court s t a t e d t h a t a wrongful d e a t h a c t i o n i s not 
d e r i v a t i v e . Rather, i t i s a new and independent ac t ion , separa te 
and d i s t i n c t from any cause of ac t ion the decedent may have had, 
which belongs e x c l u s i v e l y t o the deceden t ' s h e i r s . 3 The damages 
r e c o v e r a b l e a re those su f fe red by t h e h e i r s . No recovery i s 
allowed under t h e wrongful death s t a t u t e , U.C.A. § 78-11-7, for 
any i n j u r i e s or damages suf fe red by t he decedent , nor does any 
p a r t of the recovery pass through the deceden t ' s e s t a t e . Switzer 
v . Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244, 247 (Utah 1980). 
^ In H u l l
 r the Court held that since a wrongful death action is not 
derivative, such an action brought by a deceased's heirs is not subject to the 
defense of interspousal tort immunity. 
3 Contrast any recovery under Utahfs "Survival Statute," U.C.A § 78-11-12. 
There, the personal representative may claim and recover damages suffered by 
the decedent prior to his death. These damages belong to the decedent's 
estate and would be diminished by the percentage of decedent's contributory 
negligence, if any. 
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2. Pre-1973 Utah Decisions Barring Recovery By Heirs 
Where The Decedent Was Contributorily Negligent Are Irrelevant. 
Counsel for respondents and the trial Court below relied 
exclusively on Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 112 
Utah 189, 186 P.2d 293 (1947), for the proposition that the 
contributory negligence of a decedent may be applied to reduce 
the recovery of his heirs in a wrongful death action. 
It should be enough to point out that Van Wagoner pre-dates 
the enactment of the Comparative Negligence Statute which is the 
controlling law applicable to this case. However, some confusion 
occurs because Van Wagoner was cited, seemingly with approval, in 
Hull. Careful analysis of the context of Hull and its language 
dispels that confusion. 
It is true that prior to the adoption of comparative 
negligence in 1973, contributory negligence on the part of the 
decedent was a complete bar to an action by his heirs. However, 
and this is the key point: The basis for that result was not 
that the decedent's negligence was attributed to the heirs; 
rather, under the law as it existed, the decedent's contributory 
negligence rendered the tortfeasor's conduct not wrongful. 
In Van Wagoner the Court stated: 
The right of action running to appellants in 
this case is founded on the same unlawful acts 
of the defendant, but the loss and damages 
suffered by them arise out of the death of the 
deceased. The legislature has thus said the 
right of action vests in the heirs-at-law if 
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death ensues but it does not say the rights of 
third parties are modified, altered or changed. 
On the contrary, it bases recovery on the 
wrongful death by another and wrongful is used 
in Uie sense of wrongful as against the 
deceased, and does not include those situations 
where £h£ deceased solely or proximately 
contributes negligently to his own death. 
rvan Wagoner, supra, 112 Utah 218-219, 189 P.2d 701 (emphasis 
added).] See alSQ, Johnson v. Ottomeier, 45 Wash.2d 149, 275 
P.2d 723 (1954), cited in Hull, supra, at 105/ which held: 
The statutory basis for recognizing defenses of 
this character [(i.e.) contributory negligence], 
is to be found in the word 'wrongful1 as used in 
the stcitute. If the tortfeasor breached no duty 
owing bo decedent, or if decedent proximately 
contributed, through consent, negligence, an 
unlawful acts, to his own injury, it is 
reasonable to say that his death was not 
wrongful in the contemplation of the statute, 
(emphasis added.) 
Thus, prior to 1973, heirs could not recover under Utah's 
wrongful death statute even if the decedent was only 1% 
negligent, because any negligence on the part of the decedent 
rendered the defendant's acts not wrongful under the statute. 
Adoption of the Comparative Negligence Act changed all that. 
After 1973, a plaintiff could recover even if his own negligence 
contributed to his injuries to an extent less than 50%. 
Consequently, in a wrongful death action, the tortfeasor's 
conduct would still be considered wrongful even if the decedent 
contributed to his own death. More important however, the 1973 
Comparative Negligence Act eliminated any consideration of the 
10 
decedent's negligence in a wrongful death action with the 
language: "Any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion 
to the amount of negligence attributable to the person 
recovering." Consequently, decisions by the Utah Supreme Court 
prior to 1973 barring recovery by heirs in wrongful death actions 
when the decedent was contributorily negligent are irrelevant and 
of no value as precedent in this case.. 
So far as appellant has been able to determine, no case 
decided by the Utah Supreme Court since 1973 has addressed the 
issue presented in this appeal.4 Appellant contends that the law 
4
 But see, Phillips v. Tooele City Corp.. 28 Utah 2d 233, 500 P.2d 669 (Utah 
1972) . There, plaintiffs brought an action to recover property damages to 
their vehicle which had been involved in a collision while driven by their 
minor daughter. At trial, the jury determined that the minor driver had been 
contributorily negligent. The trial court imputed that negligence to the 
plaintiffs as a matter of law and barred their recovery. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the imputation of negligence 
and remanded the matter for a new trial to determine the negligence of the 
defendant, if any, and damages. The Court relied on its interpretation of 
Sizemore v. Bailey's Administrator, 293 S.W.2d 165-168-69 (Ky. 1956), to the 
effect that: 
Since the statute ru.C.A. § 41-2-10] did not specifically 
provide that the contributory negligence of a minor would 
preclude recovery for damages inflicted by a third party, 
the court declined to read in by judicial fiat such a 
provision. [Id. at 673.] 
The Court held: 
However, the legislative policy to broaden liability for 
the protection of an injured plaintiff gives no support 
to the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence which 
narrows the liability of a negligent defendant to a 
plaintiff, who is innocent of actual negligence, 
rid, (emphasis added).] 
The Phillips decision is important here since it underscores this Court's by 
now thorough rejection of the doctrine of imputed negligence, and because it 
is actually consistent with appellant's position in this case. 
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i s c ry s t a l c l ea r ; The negligence of Darin Kelson can not be 
compared to t h a t of the respondents in t h i s ac t ion for the 
purpose of barring or diminishing the damages recoverable by his 
he i r s . 
3. The Law In Other Ju r i sd ic t ions i s Unanimous. Where 
Actions for Damages to Family Members Resulting From Injury or 
Death to Another are Held to be Non-Derivative, the Negligence of 
the Deceased or Injured Person i s Not Applied to Bar or Reduce 
the Recovery By His Family. 
In every jur i sd ic t ion which holds that wrongful death actions 
or claims for loss of consortium due to in ju r i e s of a family 
member are non-derivative, i t i s also held that the negligence of 
the decedent or injured party cannot be applied to diminish or 
defeat the independent claims of those en t i t l ed to recover. 
The cases t h a t follow are h igh l igh ted as examples of 
decisions from jur i sd ic t ions with case and s ta tutory law similar 
to Utah.5 
a. Feltch v. General Rental 
In Feltch v. General Rental Company, 421 N.E.2d 67 (Mass. 
1981), an injured worker and his wife brought su i t for personal 
injury damages and loss of consortium respec t ive ly . The jury 
5 Many of the cases c i t e d in support of a p p e l l a n t ' s p o s i t i o n involve claims 
for l o s s of consort ium due to an in ju ry t o a spouse or family member. Utah 
does not al low l o s s of consortium claims r e s u l t i n g from i n j u r i e s , as opposed 
t o dea th . £££, Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 59 U.A.R. 21 (Utah 1987). 
However, s ince t h i s i s a death case , t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n makes no d i f f e rence to 
the a p p l i c a t i o n of the law. 
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found plaintiff Feltch 37.5% negligent and defendant 62.5% 
negligent. The damages awarded Mr. Feltch were reduced by the 
percentage of his negligence. On appeal, one issue was whether 
his wife's damages for loss of consortium should have been 
similarly reduced. 
The Court, noting that under Massachusetts law the wife's 
claim was not derivative, held that her damages should not be 
reduced. The Court also declined to impute the negligence of 
Donald Feltch to his wife. More significantly the Court relied 
on language from the Massachusetts Comparative Negligence Statute 
that is essentially the same as Utah's in support of its 
position. The Court stated: 
The language of the Massachusetts Comparative 
Negligence Statute, G.L. c. 231, § 85 (1973), 
also suggests that a spouse's negligence is not 
to be imputed to the other spouse. The statute 
provides that, in determining by what amount a 
negligent plaintiff's damages are to be 
diminished, "the negligence of each plaintiff 
shall be compared to the total negligence of all 
persons against whom recovery is sought." 
(citation omitted). Ann Feltch was not found to 
be negligent, and the statute does not indicate 
that her recovery may be reduced by the degree 
of her husband's negligence- [Hi. at 71, 
(emphasis added).] 
There is no basis in logic or law for any difference from the 
decision in Feltch in this case. If anything, the rationale for 
not reducing the damages of heirs in a wrongful death case is 
greater than in an injury case, since the damages recovered are 
distinctly separate from that which could have been recovered by 
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the deceased, and there is no danger that the deceased will enjoy 
the benefit of any recovery. 
b. Christie v. Maxwell 
Christie v. Maxwell, 40 Wash. App. 40, 696 P.2d 1256 (Wash. 
App. 1985), also involved a car-motorcycle collision. There, the 
Court held that despite the fact that the motorcycle driver was 
found to be 62.5% negligent, his wife could recover the full 
measure of any damages awarded to her for loss of consortium. 
Once again, the Court's decision turned on whether the wife's 
action was considered to be derivative to that of her husband. 
Noting that under Washington law the wife's claims were not 
derivative, the court stated that the claim for loss of 
consortium was separate and independent, and there was absolutely 
no danger of unjust enrichment or double recovery. It then set 
forth what appellant here claims is the law uniformly throughout 
the United States: 
A review of other jurisdictions shows a 
divergence of opinion on the issue of reducing 
consortium damages. Seer 21 A.L.R.3d 469-475 
(Supp. 1984), and 25 A.L.R.4th 118-144 (1983). 
Those that hold contributory negligence of 
spouse bars recovery for loss of consortium base 
their ruling on three different rationales - the 
derivative nature of the action, imputed 
negligence and assignee taking subject to 
defenses against assignor. However, those 
jurisdictions which recognize the independent 
nature of loss of consortium hold the award is 
not affected by the injured spouse's negligence. 
Fid, at 1259, emphasis added.] 
14 
See also. Mayo v. Tri-Bell Industries, Inc., 787 F.2d 1007, 1012 
(5th Cir. 1986), 
In those minority comparative negligence 
jurisdictions that have not reduced the 
plaintiff's damages for loss of consortium by 
the percentage of negligence attributed to the 
negligent spouse, it has been because, unlike 
Texas, they do not consider the loss of 
consortium to be a derivative source of damages. 
c. Brann v. Exeter Clinic, Inc. 
Brann v. Exeter Clinic, Inc., 498 A.2d 334 (N.H. 1985), was a 
wrongful death action involving two claims: One for the benefit 
of the deceased's estate, and the other brought by the wife of 
the deceased for loss of consortium. The jury found defendants 
49% negligent, the decedent 51% negligent, and awarded the wife 
$300,000 for loss of consortium. The New Hampshire Supreme Court 
noting that the wife's claim was not derivative, ruled that the 
wife's claim would not be barred or reduced by the verdict 
rendered against the plaintiff in the negligence action. See 
3lS0/ Macon v, Seaward Construction Company, 555 F.2d 1, 2 (1st 
Cir. 1977), applying New Hampshire law; and Goldman v. United 
States, 790 F.2d 181, 185 n.4 (1st. Cir. 1986), in which the 
Court stated: 
To be sure, the district court's denial of 
recovery to Goldman himself can be readily 
upheld under the Massachusetts law of 
comparative negligence. The Court could properly 
have found, and doubtless did find, that 
Goldman's negligence was 'greater than the 
amount of negligence attributable' to the 
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defendant, and thus a bar to his own recovery, 
(citations omitted) But under Massachusetts law 
as ii now stands, Goldman's contributory 
negligence would not bar his wife and children 
from recovery - assuming the United States were 
actually negligent here, (emphasis added.) 
d. Herold v. Burlington Northern 
in Herold v. Burlington Northern, Inc./ 761 F.2d 1241 (8th 
Cir. 1985), the Eighth Circuit, applying North Dakota law, held 
that the District Court had erred when it reduced a wife's $2.25 
million judgment by the percentage of her co-plaintiff husband's 
contributory negligence. 
The status of North Dakota law governing the action was 
exactly the same as existed in Utah in this case. The court 
held: 
Although the court generally defers to the 
district court's interpretation of local law, in 
this case we believe the district court was 
incorrect. Under North Dakota law it is clear 
that a wife's claim for loss of consortium is an 
independent right, not contingent upon the 
rights, or liabilities of her husband, (citation 
omitted) Furthermore, the negligence of a driver 
cannot be imputed to his passenger. (citation 
omitted) Also, the North Dakota contributory 
negligence statute provides that recovery for 
injury shall be reduced only "in proportion to 
the amount of negligence attributable to the 
person recovering." (emphasis in original.) 
* * * * * 
The contrary cases c i ted by the defendants are 
from s t a t e s which cons ide r the l o s s of 
consortium claims to be derivative act ions. 
[Id. at 1249]. 
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e. Morgan v. Lalumiere 
In Morgan v. Lalumiere, 22 Mass, App. Ct. 262, 493 N.E.2d 206 
(1986), the Court held that a spouse or child is not barred from 
recovering from a negligent tortfeasor for his independent injury 
even though his spouse or parent was more at fault than the party 
against whom recovery is sought. There, the injured party's 
recovery was denied since the jury found he was 52% negligent, 
compared with 48% for the defendant. However, the court ruled 
that the full amount of the judgment awarded the husband for loss 
of consortium should stand, and reversed the trial court's 
judgment N.O.V., thereby reinstating the full amount of the jury 
verdict for the injured party's son. 
As has been pointed out, the Utah Supreme Court has held that 
the heirs' claims in a wrongful death case are not derivative. 
In addition, the language of the Comparative Negligence Statute 
applicable to this case clearly indicated that only the 
negligence of those seeking recovery is relevant for comparative 
purposes. The conclusion, supported by the unanimous holding 
from jurisdictions with similar law, is inescapable: Darin 
Kelson's negligence should not have been considered by the jury 
for the purpose of barring or reducing appellant's claims. 
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f. Additional Case Law, 
Other courts which have ruled that the recovery by heirs or 
family members for loss of consortium when another is injured or 
killed is not reduced by comparative negligence include: Fuller 
v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1980), in which the Court 
persuasively set forth the following rationale for its decision: 
To deny a consortium claim because of the 
injured spouse's negligence would, in fact, 
create a new kind of unfairness. It would force 
the plaintiff, who was free from fault, to 
assume the full burden of damages caused by the 
negligence of others* It would also unjustly 
permit the negligent tortfeasor to escape 
liability altogether merely because of the 
fortuitous negligence of another [Id. at 679.] 
See also, Qlsen v, Bell Telephone Laboratories/ 445 N.E.2d 609, 
612 (Mass. 1983); Dunn v. Rose Way. Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830, 832-33 
(Iowa 1983); Childers v. McGeer 306 N.W.2d 778 (Iowa 1981); 
Handeland v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Iowa 1974); Vesey v. 
Snohomish County. 721 P.2d 524 (Wash. App. 1986); Stapleton v. 
Palmore, 162 Ga. App. 525, 291 S.E.2d 445 (1982); and LantJS V. 
Condon, 95 Cal. App. 3d 152, 157 Cal. Rptr 22 (1979). 
g. Other Authorities. 
The majority of legal commentators and authorities that have 
considered the issue have determined that claims for loss of 
consortium are not derivative, and should not be reduced by the 
percentage of the injured party's negligence. See, e.g./ 
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2 Harper & James, Torts § 23.8 (1956); Prosser, Torts § 125, at 
937-38 (5th Ed.); Thompson & Chacon, "Loss of Consortium and 
Contributory Negligence: What's the Rule?" Tex. Bar J., p. 834 
(July 1985); Dickson, "Loss of Consortium; An Independent or 
Derivative Cause of Action?" Trial, pg. 54 (Aug. 1986). 
c. Even If The Deceased Is More Than 50% Negligent f tils. 
Heirs1 Claims Should Not Be Barred Under Utah Law. 
In Utah, an injured party or the estate of a deceased can 
only recover damages if the plaintiff is found to be less than 
50% negligent. U.C.A. § 78-27-37 (1973, repealed 1986). See 
also, § 78-27-38 (1986) . In this case, the jury found 
appellant's decedent Darin Kelson to have been 75% at fault for 
his death. 
However, since a wrongful death action in Utah is not 
derivative, and particularly given the plain language of the 
Comparative Negligence Statute applicable to this case, the non-
negligent heirs in a wrongful death action should be able to 
recover the full measure of their damages if the defendant is at 
fault to any degree. 
That has been the unanimous conclusion in "non-derivative" 
jurisdictions. See, Morgan v. Lalumiere, supra, deceased 51% at 
fault; Christie V. Maxwell, supra, injured party 62.5% at fault; 
Lantis V. Condon, supra, injured party 80% at fault; Goldman v. 
U.S.. suprar 790 F.2d at 185 n. 4. 
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D. Any Change In The Law Must Come From The Legislature. 
It has and will be argued that it is unfair to allow the 
heirs or relatives of a person to recover their full measure of 
damages, including loss of consortium, where the deceased is 
found to be partially or predominantly at fault for his own 
injuries. However, it is equally if not more unfair to deprive 
family members of their separate and independent damages when 
they were in no way at fault, and there is a third-party 
tortfeasor whose conduct contributed to the cause of the injury 
or death. 
In those jurisdictions with law the same or similar to Utah, 
the Courts have fulfilled their duty to apply the law, though 
sometimes reluctantly, and held that if the law needs to be 
changed for any reason, it is up to the legislature to do it. 
Thus, in Feltch v. General Rental, supra, the Court held: 
Ann Feltch was not found to be negligent, and 
the statute does not indicate that her recovery 
may be reduced by the degree of her husband's 
negligence . . . ("the statute provides only 
that a plaintiff1s recovery is to be reduced by 
his or her own degree of fault, and in the 
instant case, the wife was not at fault.") Any 
change in the legislative policy as expressed in 
the statute is foe the legislature, We are not 
free to fashion remedies not sanctioned by the 
words of the statute nor by the policies 
underlying the statute. rid. 421 N.E.2d at 71 
(emphasis added).] 
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In Morgan v. Lalumiere, supra, where the injured party was 
found to be 52% at fault, the Court held: 
We recognize that, carried to its extreme, such 
a rule may have incongruous results. A party 
only slightly at fault would be compelled to 
compensate a claimant for his full loss 
notwithstanding a high degree of contributory 
fault on the part of the claimant's spouse or 
parent. There is precedent in other states, 
however, for a rule permitting recovery by a 
plaintiff of the full amount of his loss even 
though his spouse may have been considerably 
more at fault than the party being sued. 
(Citing, Lantis EL. Condon and Christie v. 
Maxwell.) 
* * * * * 
If there is a potential for an unfair result in 
an extreme case, the legislature may reform the 
rule. rid.. 493 N.E.2d at 212-13. (emphasis 
added) . ] 
Perhaps the best example of a Court's adherence to its duty 
to apply the law occurs in Christie v. Maxwell, supra. There, 
the injured spouse was found to be 62.5% negligent. 
Nevertheless, the court held: 
While we may feel it is basically unfair to 
allow Mrs. Christie 100 percent recovery from 
Mr. Maxwell where her husband was 62.5 percent 
contributorily negligent, we are constrained by 
our interpretation of [the statute] and the 
rules of statutory construction from reducing 
her damages 62.5 percent. 
* * * * * 
"The Court cannot read into a statute that which 
it may believe the legislature has omitted, be 
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it an intentional or inadvertent omission." 
(citation omitted). [Id., 696 P.2d at 1260.] 
The same rule applies in this case. The law is clear. If it 
is possible for unfair results to ensue, it is up to the 
legislature to make the change. 
The Utah Supreme Court has very recently exhibited its 
deference to this principle. In Hackforti v. Utah Power & Light 
£Q^f 59 U.A.R. 21 (Utah 1987), the Court denied spouses the right 
to recover damages for loss of consortium for an injured, as 
opposed to a deceased spouse. The decision was based on an 
interpretation of the 1898 Married Women's Act, the meaning and 
intent of which was at least subject to question; and despite the 
fact that the law is virtually unanimous throughout the United 
States that plaintiffs may recover loss of consortium damages 
arising from serious injuries to their spouse. In so ruling, this 
Court held: 
If the cause of action argued for by the 
plaintiff-appellant is to be created anew in 
Utah, it should be done by the legislature. 
Similarly, if appellant's right to recover damages for loss of 
consortium in this case, clearly provided by unambiguous statutory 
language is to be taken away or reduced, it should be done by the 
legislature. 
It is important to note that the Utah legislature has already 
had one opportunity to amend the statutory language relied on by 
appellant on this case, but did not do so. In 1986, the 
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l eg i s l a tu re abolished joint and several l i a b i l i t y and completely 
r ev i sed the Comparative Negligence s ec t i on of the Code, 
Nevertheless, the present §78-27-38 (1986), s t i l l provides: 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shal l not 
alone bar recovery by tha t person. He may 
recover from any defendant QX group af 
defendants whose f au l t exceeds h i s own. 
(emphasis added.) 
The heirs of Darin Kelson were not at fault at all. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE SIBLINGS OF DARIN 
KELSON COULD NOT RECOVER DAMAGES UNDER UTAH'S WRONGFUL DEATH 
STATUTE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7 (1953), dealing with the wrongful 
death of an adult, provides in relevant part as follows: 
. . . only one action can be maintained for the 
injury to or death of such person, and such 
action may be brought by either the personal 
representatives of such adult deceased person, 
for the benefit of his heirs, or by such 
guardian for the benefit of the heirs as 
provided in the next preceding section [78-11-
6] . in every action under this and the next 
preceding section [78-11-61 such damages may be 
given as under all the circumstances of the case 
may be just, (emphasis added.) 
The position that only the parents of Darin Kelson are 
eligible to recover damages for his wrongful death relies 
necessarily on a construction of the term "heirs" as defined in 
Utah's Probate Code [§§ 75-1-201 (17); 75-2-103]. This reliance 
is misplaced. There is only one cause of action available for 
all potential plaintiffs in a wrongful death action, Switzer v. 
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Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244, 246 (Utah 1980), and that cause of action 
belongs individually to those persons who suffer a loss by virtue 
of the wrongful death* 
It is illogical to rely on a technical intestate succession 
definition in this context, since very rarely will a 21 year old 
unmarried man leave a will or an estate. A wrongful death action 
has nothing whatever to do with intestate succession, the source 
of the technical meaning of "heirs." Rather, the proceeds of a 
wrongful death action are separate from the deceased's estate and 
belong individually to the persons injured as a result of the 
wrongful death. Switzer v. Reynoldsf suprar at 246. These 
persons, where the death involves an unemancipated child or 
adult, are the family of the deceased, including siblings. 
In Chavez v. Regents of the University of New Mexico, 103 
N.M. 606, 711 P.2d 883, 885-86 (1985), the New Mexico Supreme 
Court held that the technical definition of "personal 
representative" in that state's Probate Code, did not apply to 
wrongful death actions. Consequently, the Court found that 
"personal representative" in a wrongful death action could and 
should be interpreted more liberally than the technical meaning 
for probate actions. Similarly, it makes sense here to include 
the siblings of an unemancipated young man as "heirs" in a 
wrongful death action. 
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Appellant recognizes that there must be a line drawn at some 
point to define the class of persons who may claim damages in any 
given tort action. To that end, appellant suggests that the only 
logical line that can be drawn in a case involving the death of 
an unemancipated person is that of his immediate family. It is 
simply impossible to say that the parents of Darin Kelson 
suffered injury as a result of his death, but that the brothers 
and sisters he grew up with did not. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated explicitly that among the 
primary elements of damage in a wrongful death action are the 
emotional or "psychic" injuries suffered by loved ones such as 
Darin Kelson's brothers and sisters in this case. In Jones v. 
Carvel1, 641 P.2d 105, 110 (Utah 1982), the court stated: 
In this jurisdiction, we recognize that the 
central loss resulting from the death of a child 
results from the destruction of those 
intangible, but nevertheless very real human 
relationships in which the blessings of love, 
society and companionship are both given and 
received with benefit to both the giver and the 
receiver. 
It is precisely such intangible injury for which Darin Kelson's 
siblings seek redress in this case. To deny their claims is to 
ignore the express language of the Utah Supreme Court, is 
contrary to the statutory language that "such damages may be 
given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just," 
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and excuses tortfeasors from compensation for readily foreseeable 
injuries they have inflicted. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITTING A 
STIPULATION RELATING TO THE ALLEDGED BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT 
OF DARIN KELSON. 
The court's attention is directed again to the facts 
associated with this point. Put simply, appellant's former 
counsel stipulated to the single most damaging piece of evidence 
against his client without his knowledge or consent, and in fact 
against his express directions. Mr. Hansen later admits that he 
had no authority to enter into the Stipulation, can't fathom why 
he may have done it, and doesn't even remember doing it. He 
actually stated to the undersigned: "I must have been drunk when 
I did it." 
It is universally held that while stipulations of counsel are 
generally binding on the parties affected by them, relief from a 
stipulation may be granted by a court in the exercise of its 
discretion on the grounds of misrepresentation, inadvertence, 
improvidence, where the stipulation was ill-advised, or if to set 
aside the stipulation would avoid injustice rather than create 
it. 
The law is set forth generally in 83 C.J.S., Stipulations, 
§§ 34-35 at pp.88-93. No case has been found dealing 
specifically with a stipulation regarding blood alcohol content 
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of a victim in a wrongful death case. However, the case law 
uniformly holds that the decision on whether to grant relief from 
a stipulation is a judgment call to be made on the particular 
facts and circumstances of each case. Appellant asserts that a 
more compelling case for relief from a stipulation would be 
difficult to imagine. 
Certainly, the best that can be said for the Stipulation was 
that it was improvident and ill-advised. As to the latter, it is 
important to note that the Stipulation was between appellant's 
former "counsel," Robert Hansen, and Lou Midgley who died long 
before the case came to trial. No one, including appellant or 
trial counsel for both sides even knew about the Stipulation 
until it was discovered in an old file. It wasn't even filed 
with the court until shortly before the original trial date. 
Under the circumstances, appellant respectfully contends that 
the trial Court abused its discretion in admitting the 
Stipulation. 
A. Admission of the Stipulation Constituted Pre judicial 
Error. 
Other than the Stipulation, respondents had absolutely no 
evidence that Darin Kelson was intoxicated on the night he died. 
On the other hand, appellant was able to produce testimony of 
witnesses who were with Darin Kelson for the entire day prior to 
his death, right up to minutes before the time of the collision. 
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Their uncontroverted testimony was that he had only one drink 
several hours before the collision and that he looked and acted 
perfectly sober at all times. 
Nevertheless, in her closing argument to the jury, Deputy 
County Attorney Pat Marlowe relied almost exclusively on Darin 
Kelson's alleged intoxication in support of respondents1 
contributory negligence claim. Intoxication was stressed no less 
than 15. times in respondents1 closing argument. [The full text 
of the closing argument is attached for the Court's reference. 
(See, Exhibit H) ] These examples might help enlighten the Court 
as to the tenor of the argument: 
And Mr. Kelson undertook all those risks, 
engaged in all those actions upon the occasion 
of March 13, 1984, and now his parents want you 
to give them money because of their son's 
suicide. That's exactly what it is. This 
individual voluntarily consumed alcohol, he 
voluntarily intoxicated himself. [Exhibit H at 
pp. 4-5.] 
* * * * * 
You have heard the intoxication evidence. You 
know that his vision was (sic) impaired, and you 
know that his reasoning was impaired, and you 
know that his hearing was impaired. You know 
that his manual dexterity was impaired. You 
know that this man was operating a motorcycle 
when he was drunk. And yet you are supposed to 
believe that he couldn't have prevented the 
accident. [Exhibit H at 11.] 
It cannot be questioned that evidence of alleged alcohol 
consumption and intoxication in a case involving a collision 
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between a speeding motorcycle and a police car i s p re jud ic ia l in 
the extreme.6 I t i s also c lear tha t respondents would not have 
been unduly prejudiced i f the court had granted appellant r e l i e f 
from the S t ipu la t ion . All tha t would have been required was for 
a p p e l l a n t t o put on a proper case r e l a t i n g to a lcohol 
consumption, i t s e f fec t , and the r e l i a b i l i t y of the blood t e s t 
procedures used. 
Appellant always has and continues to dispute the a l l ega t ion 
t ha t Darin had been dr inking and was i n tox i ca t ed . However, 
because of the improvident , i l l - a d v i s e d , unwarranted and 
unauthor ized S t i p u l a t i o n t h a t was admit ted i n to evidence, 
appe l lan t ' s case was dealt a crushing blow. 
Appellant contends t h a t the admission of the S t ipu l a t i on 
under the circumstances was an abuse of d i sc re t ion r e su l t i ng in 
p r e jud i c i a l e r r o r . Appellant respec t fu l ly requests t h a t , upon 
remand, that the Stipulat ion be held to be inadmissible. 
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 Consequent ly , an a l t e r n a t i v e b a s i s for a p p e l l a n t ' s p o s i t i o n i s Rule 403, 
Utah Rules of Evidence r which provides t h a t evidence should be excluded i f i t s 
p r o b a t i v e va lue i s outweighed by i t s tendency t o confuse t h e j u r y , or i f i t i s 
unduly p r e j u d i c i a l . 
In t h i s case , while the purpor ted S t i p u l a t i o n had l i t e r a l l y no p roba t ive 
va lue , i t was p r e j u d i c i a l in the extreme. Fu r the r , counsel for respondent was 
al lowed t o r e l y almost e x c l u s i v e l y on t h e non-evidence of i n t o x i c a t i o n t o 
inflame the j u r y . In s h o r t , by a l lowing the S t i p u l a t i o n t o come in , t he t r i a l 
Court gave respondents a wild card t o p lay t h a t was not earned or j u s t i f i a b l e 
by any no t ion of f a i r n e s s , and which was imposs ible for a p p e l l a n t t o coun te r . 
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CONCLUSION 
Utah law clearly and expressly provides that any negligence 
of the deceased should not be compared with that of a tortfeasor 
for the purposes of determining liability and damages in a 
wrongful death case. The trial Court's instructions to the jury 
to the contrary constituted reversible error. 
The Court also erroneously excluded the siblings of Darin 
Kelson from the class of persons entitled to damages for his 
wrongful death. In the case of a minor or adult, with no wife or 
children, the only logical class for recovery under Utah's 
Wrongful Death statute is the victim's immediate family. 
Finally, the trial Court committed prejudicial reversible 
error when it refused to grant appellant relief from a ridiculous 
and expressly unauthorized Stipulation executed by two attorneys 
who had nothing to do with the trial. The Stipulation, involving 
the alleged blood alcohol level of Darin Kelson at the time of 
his death, was the single most damaging piece of "evidence" used 
by respondents at trial. Although it was contrary to the direct 
testimony in the case, it was relied on quite heavily by 
respondents' counsel in arguing the alleged fault of appellant's 
decedent. 
WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully requests that the judgment 
below be reversed and remanded for a determination of damages 
only. If remanded for re-trial, appellant requests that it be 
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with instructions to include the siblings of Darin Kelson as 
persons eligible to recover damages; and that the blood alcohol 
Stipulation be inadmissible. 
DATED this (# " day of August, 1987. 
COLLARD & RUSSELL 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this # day of August, 1937, 
I mailed (4) copies of Appellant's Brief On Appeal to all 
counsel of record for respondents at their address as shown 
below, by depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-
paid. 
DAVID E. YOCUM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
PATRICIA J. MARLOWE 
THOMAS L. CHRISTEMSEN 
2001 South State #3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Exhibit A 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^M 
This case will be submitted to you on the basis of 
comparative negligence. 
If you find that the death of Darin Kelson was proximately 
caused by a combination of the negligence of the defendant Perry 
Buckner and the negligence of Darin Kelson, then you must 
determine the percentage of negligence you assign to defendant 
Perry Buckner and the percentage of negligence you assign to 
Darin Kelson in causing the death of Darin Kelson. 
In assigning percentages of negligence, you should keep in 
mind that the percentage of negligence to a party is not to be 
measured solely by the number of particulars in which a party is 
found to have been negligent. 
You should weigh the respective contributions, if any, of 
each person to the death in question and considering the conduct 
of each as a whole, determine whether one made a larger 
contribution than the other, and if so, to what extent it exceeds 
that of the other. 
Instruction Nc. 3£ 
In corparing the negligence cf the respective parties, if you 
find that the negligence attributable to Darin Kelson is 0 to 49%, 
and the negligence of defendant Bjckner is greater than 5C%, then 
the Kelsons will recover carnages against the defendants. 
However, if the percentage of negligence you assign to Darin 
Kelson is equal to or greater than the percentage of negligence 
assigned to defendant Buckner, then the parents of Darin Kelson 
will recover nothing on their claims. 
Any percentage of negligence which you assign to Darin Kelson 
will be used by the Court to reduce any damages that you award to 
his parents. In determining the amount of damages to the Kelsons 
as a result of their son's death, you should not make any reduction 
based on any percentage of negligence you attribute to Darin Kelson. 
Any reduction that is necessary will be made by the Court. The 
Court will know what to do with your figures. 
Exhibit B 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DARRELL KELSON, personal 
representative of the estate 
of DARIN KELSON, deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision, and PERRY 
BUCKNER in a representative 
capacity only, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
CIVIL NO. C-84-5659 
We, the jury in the above-entitled action, for our Special 
Verdict, answer the questions submitted as follows: 
Question No. 1: Was defendant Perry Buckner negligent? 
Answer: Yes ^ No 
If your answer to question No. 1 was "no," do not 
answer any further questions on the Special Verdict. 
Question No. 2: If your answer to question No. 1 was 
"yes," was such negligence on the part of Perry Buckner a proximate 
cause of Darin Kelson's death? 
Answer: Yes No 
I f your answer t o q u e s t i o n No. 2 was " n o , " do not 
answer any f u r t h e r ques t ions on t h i s Spec ia l Ve rd i c t . 
I f your answer t o q u e s t i o n No. 2 i s " y e s , " go on to 
t h e next page . 
EXHIBIT B 
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Question No. 3: Was the decedent Darin Kelson negligent 
in operating his motorcycle? 
Answer: Yes No 
If your answer to question No. 3 vas "no," do not 
answer question No. 4 in this Special Verdict. 
Question No. 4: If your answer to question No. 3 was 
"yes/1 was such negligence on the part of decedent Darin Kelson 
a proximate cause of his death? 
Answer: Yes * No 
If your answer to either question No. 3 or No. 4 was 
"no," do not answer question No. 5. 
Question No. 5: Taking the combined negligence which 
caused decedent Darin Kelson*s death at 100%, what percentage 
of such negligence do you attribute to: 
(a) Perry Buckner ZS % 
(b) Darin Kelson 7$ % 
TOTAL 100 % 
If your answer to either question No. 1 or No. 2 was 
"no," do not answer question No. 6. 
Question No. 6: What sum of money will fairly and reasonably 
compensate plaintiffs for the loss of decedent Darin Kelson? 
$ 
DATED this Zf day of January, 1987. 
^ ^ ^ 
FOREPERSON 
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ROBERT B. HANSEN 
A T " S K E Y A T „ A W 
SAu* ^AKE Ci'H', J ""AH ©4^)7 
SO 2 6 2 5 S l » 4 
July 26, 1985 
Darrell Kelson 
3220 South 7945 West 
Magna, Utah 84044 
Re: Wrongful death 
Dear Darrell: 
Yesterday I received 15 pages of photo copies of notes 
I assume you made after talking to various persons. 
The thrust of these statements seem to be that you want 
to take issues with the fact that your son was not drinking as much 
as the tests for blood alcohol indicate, not driving his motorcycle as 
fast as the police claim. 
As you know i t was my opinion that we'd have to accept 
those facts and win in spite of them. With Val Shuppe's testimony 
I think we can do that. However, since you seem determined to try 
the case by fighting those facts i t would seem best for you to find 
other counsel who agrees with that approach and pay me and Mr. DeBry 
for what we've done to this point. 
Please consider this and let me know soon. 
Robert B. Hansen 
RBH:hk 
Cc: C. Richard Hendricksen 
Rulon Burton & Associates 
Exhibit D 
KATHRYN COLLARD, #0697 
J. STEPHEN RUSSELL, #2631 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
401 Boston Building 
Nine Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DARRELL KELSON, personal 
representative of the 
Estate of Darin Kelson, 
Plaintiff, 
* AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT B. HANSEN 
IN SUPPOPRT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
* SECOND MOTION IN LIMINE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah; and PERRY BUCKNER, in a 
representative capacity only, 
Defendants. 
* Civil No. C-84-5659 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
SALT LAKE COUNTY) 
:ss . 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ROBERT B. HANSEN, being first duly sworn upon his oath, 
deposes and states: 
1. I was formerly counsel for the plaintiff in the above 
referenced action. 
2. During the entire time I represented the plaintiff, I 
was aware that the plaintiff vigorously contested that his son 
was intoxicated at the time of the collision involved in this 
case and that he believed there were irregularities in the 
manner in which the blood sample was taken from his deceased 
son, Darin Dee Kelson, after the collision. 
3. At no time did the plaintiff authorize me to enter into 
any stipulations with the defendants in this case with respect 
to the results of a blood alcohol test alleged to have been 
performed on plaintiff's decedent, Darin Dee Kelson, following 
the collision. 
4. In fact, I have no recollection of ever entering into 
any stipulation with the defendants' former counsel, L.E. 
Midgley, now deceased, regarding such matter. 
DATED this 24th day of October, 1986. 
/6L*£TbL *-*<*+*' +A*r* 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
VERIFICATION 
On October 24, 1986, personally appeared before me Robert 
B. Hansen, who, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposed 
and stated to me that he had read the foregoing document and 
that he knows and understands the contents thereof and that the 
same are true, to the best of his knowledge, information and 
belief and that he signed the foregoing document in my 
presence. 
DATED this 24th day of October, 1986. 
NOTARY PUBLIC {
 ; 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
My, Commission Expires: 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this<^f day of Octoter, 1986, 
I had a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit 
hand delivered Ms. Patricia Marlowe, Attorney for Defendants, 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, 241 East 400 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84111. 
rju^q. K, 
Exhibit E 
KATnRYN CuLLARD, *Q69T 
J. S7E?hEls RUbSELL, #2631 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4ul Boston Building 
Nine Exchange Place 
Salt LaKe City, Utah 84111 
IS THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DARRELL KELSON, personal 
representative of the 
Estate of Darin Kelson, 
Plaintiff, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY", a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah; and PEPRY BUCKNER, in a 
representative capacity only, 
Defendants• 
* AFFIDAVIT OF DARRELL KELSON 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
* MOTION IN LIMINE 
* Civil No. C-64-5659 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
: ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
DARRELL KELSON, being first duly sworn upon his oath, 
deposes and states: 
1. I am the plaintiff in the above entitled action. 
2. I make this Affidavit based upon personal knowledge. 
3. In September, 19S6, my counselr Kathryn Coilard, 
informed me of the existence of a Stipulation purportedly 
executed on my behalf by my former attorney, Robert Hansen, 
EXHIBIT 2 
relating to the authenticity of a document purporting to 
be a toxicology report on the blood alcohol content of the 
body of my deceased son, Darin Kelson, at the time of his 
death. 
4. Prior to the time Ms. Collard informed me of the 
existence of the Stipulation, I had no knowledge concerning 
the Stipulation and had never discussed it with Mr. Hansen 
and had never authorized him to agree or execute the said 
Stipulation in my behalf. 
5. Because of my personal belief that there were 
irregularities in the manner in which the blood sample was 
taken from my son/ and because 1 believe such evidence is 
irrelevant to any issue in the above entitled action and 
that its introduction at trial would be prejudicial to my 
case, I would not have authorized Mr. Hansen to execute 
the Stipulation, and request that this Court permit the 
Stipulation to be withdrawn. 
DATED this 21st day of October, 1986. 
/;
 }S \t, ; j Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED TO AND SWORN BEFORE ^ £ this 21st d/y of October, 
1986. 
My Commission Expires: 
^ 0 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
t. MO 
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Exhibit G 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
A ~ " r C = ? N . E v A"" _ A W 
< 7 c : = ? v ' ^ - ? ; ; Z-*s~ 3- C 
5 A L ' uA<r C ^ . ' A - 64 17 
e : sez =e : - t 
August 26, 1385 
Darrell Kelson 
3220 South 7945 West 
Magna, Utah 84044 
Dear Darrell: 
Under seperate cover I am sending you papers from your 
file that may be of use to successor counsel. 
I understand you have picked up your file from Mr. Hendricksen, 
I estimate I have spent over three hours on your case so you 
owe me $300 out of any settlement or verdict you obtain. Please 
confirm that debt. 
Yetfrk truly, . 
Robert B. Hansen 
RBHrhk 
Cc: C. Richard Hendricksen 
350 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Material mailed under S.C. 
Exhibit H 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DARRELL KELSON, Personal 
Representative of the 
Estate of Darin Kelson, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah; and PERRY BUCKNER, in a 
representative capacity only, 
Defendants. 
C84-5659 
REPORTER'S PARTIAL 
TRANSCRIPT 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 28th day of January, 
1987, the above-entitled action came on regularly for 
hearing before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Judge 
in the Third Judicial District for the State of Utah, 
and was reported by me, Gayle B. Campbell, a Registered 
Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendants; 
Kathryn Collard and 
J. Stephen Russell 
Attorneys at Law 
401 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Patricia J. Marlowe and 
Thomas L. Christensen 
Deputy County Attorneys 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
GAYLE B. CAMPBELL 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REFQZUZ 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
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Salt Lake City, Utah January 28, 1987 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Excerpt of proceedings containing closing argument 
of Patricia Marlowe representing the State of Utah.) 
THE COURT: Are you ready to proceed, Ms. 
Marlowe. 
MS. Marlowe: I am, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MS. MARLOWE: May it please the Court, 
counsel, members of the jury: You will be happy to know 
that it's almost your turn, that the lawyers' turns are 
almost over, and that you do not have to listen to either 
of us anymore. You have to listen to me and Ms. Collard 
again, then it's up to you. You get to retire and deliberate, 
and you're going to decide what the facts and circumstances 
were as they occurred on March 13, 1984, at the time of 
this collision between Perry Buckner's patrol car and 
Darrell Kelson's motorcycle. 
I want to remind you that the hard part for 
you lies just ahead, that it's not easy to be jurors, 
and I would ask you to recall the oath that you took. 
You agreed that you were going to decide this case based 
upon the facts and based upon the law as the Court has 
instructed you on. And that oath is sacred and you have 
to follow that oath and you are bound by the facts and 
Jyou are also bound by the law. 
You also agreed that you would not decide this 
|case based upon sympathy, and you have been instructed 
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that you will not decide this case based on sympathy. 
So the fact that an individual died, and unfortunately 
died, is not a basis for making your decision in this 
case. Specifically, you cannot find that the defendant 
Buckner was negligent solely based upon the fact that 
Darin Kelson was killed on March 13, 1984. Rather, 
you have been instructed by the Court that you must find 
that there was a breach of some duty, or some negligence 
which proximately caused the death of Darin Kelson. 
And further, you have been instructed that you would then 
have to make some determination of damage. But you have 
to consider those instructions which the Court has given 
you, which you will take with you to the jury room, in arriving 
at your decision in this case. 
Let's examine what you have seen and heard over 
these many days and talk about some of the exhibits and 
what bearing they have on your consideration of this case. 
You all know now that Darin Kelson was a young man, 
that according to the defendant's version of the facts 
D arin Kelson consumed at least five drinks sometime 
on March 13, 1984, and that he left his house on his motorcycle 
and was on his way to work. That he deliberately turned 
in front of a peace officer, Officer Wilden, that he acceler-
ated rapidly and deliberately drew the peace officer's 
attention, or the officer's attention such that he caused 
Officer Wilden to attempt to make a stop for speeding. 
And Officer Wilden activated his light and siren, 
and Mr. Kelson did not stop. Mr. Kelson at that minute 
3 
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1 in time could have prevented this whole incident just 
2 by reason of stopping for the speeding violation. But 
oh, no, probably involved by the alcohol, feeling euphoric, 
he proceeded to engage in a high speed dangerous chase 
with Officer Wilden, which ultimately culminated in his 
death. 
And during that chase Mr. Kelson again had an 
opportunity to stop, and Mr. Kelson did not stop. Mr. 
8 I Kelson saw the police officers upon two occasions, at 
g I the time he turned in front of the police prior to the 
time this chase ever really began, and saw him again throughout 
the chase clearly. Mr. Kelson was aware that there was 
a peace officer following him, that there was a siren 
going, that there were lights going, but instead he led 
the officer through the subdivision, violating all speed 
laws, and continued from this to flee from this police 
15 officer in violation of Utah state law. 
16 I And then when Mr. Kelson pulled on to 5400 South, 
or 5415 South, which later becomes 5400 South, he was 
on a straight away. He had a straight shot, and arguably 
he opened up his speed. He was on this high production 
bike that he thought and he knew and he was confident, 
probably by reason of his intoxication, that he could 
outrun this peace officer, and he proceeded to try and 
do so, 
23 A And Mr. Kelson undertook all those risks, engaged 
24 in all those actions upon the occasion of March 13, 1984, 
9S „and now his parents want you to give them money because 
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of their sons suicide. That's exactly what it is. This 
individual voluntarily consumed alcohol, he voluntarily 
intoxicated himself. 
You have heard from the Court that a blood level 
in excess of .08 is unlawful. It is unlawful with that 
| blood level to operate a motor vehicle in the State of 
Utah. Mr. Kelson's blood alcohol level was in excess 
of that amount. He was at .11 percent blood alcohol, 
and yet he operated this motorcycle. You all realize 
what we're talking about is a high powered motorcycle, 
and we're talking about an instrumentality that probably 
a lot of you would say was dangerous, and I believe Mrs. 
Kelson didn't like that motorcycle. She implied that 
it was not safe, her son engaging in the operation of a 
motorcycle at high speeds in violation of traffic laws 
and while he's intoxicated. And for that conduct these 
plaintiffs want you to award them damages. 
I can also indicate to you that Mr. Kelson, 
while fleeing from the officers, failed to keep to the 
right, that he could have avoided this traffic accident 
or this accident if he was driving to the right. This 
collision occurred in a left turn lane, more towards the 
center of the intersection. 
If Mr. Kelson had been watching where he was 
I going, if Mr. Kelson had been driving 45 miles an hour 
or had been driving at even a lesser speed, he would not 
have hit that officer's patrol car, Perry Buckner's patrol 
car in that intersection. 
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Yet plaintiffs have twisted this case and turned 
it upon its head and they are saying, well, but for the 
fact that Buckner was in the intersection, this death 
would never have occurred. This death would never have 
occurred but for the fact that Darin Kelson was intoxicated 
| on March 13, 1984, he voluntarily became intoxicated, 
he got on a motorcycle, he ran from police officers, deliber-
ately engaging their pursuit. 
He must have felt euphoric in that he continued 
to drive in violation of all traffic laws or all traffic 
laws as you have been so instructed, and he failed to 
keep a proper lookout. 
You have testimony that when the chase turned 
on to 5415 South that it was elevated and the road was 
raised. And so you have Officer Wilden at one point seeing 
the officers clearly at this intersection because all 
of these patrol cars were in elevated areas. 
And so the only person who might somehow — 
or the person that can see best in this particular case 
would be this D a r i n Kelson. You have him at this high 
point looking across the people and could have seen 
Officer Buckner's patrol car as well as the other patrol 
cars, assuming that the road continues down, and there 
is some evidence to indicate the directions. He was clearly 
in a better position to see the two patrol cars who had 
these huge overhead lights than these patrol cars were 
able to see this single little light on the motorcyclist 
that arguably was lost in the depression. 
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Plaintiffs make a big deal about there were 
all these officers and they saw the motorcyclist but Buckner 
didn't. They somehow suggest to you that he deliberately 
pulled out into the path of the motorcycle. And if he 
didn't do it deliberately, then he did it negligently 
or carelessly because he should have known that that motorcycle 
was right up, coming right at him. 
What he didn't tell you — what plaintiffs failed 
to tell you is that Mr. Kelson was in the best position 
to see anything in this case, but that he failed to look. 
He is the person who failed to keep a proper lookout. 
Instead, he engages in this reckless conduct and he drives 
this motorcycle in a reckless and dangerous fashion. 
How is a reasonable peace officer supposed to 
detect a single headlight moving toward him at excessive 
speed? Why should that light not get lost in all of the 
backlight around the area? How do you know that single 
spotlight was not lost in the depression in the road at 
the time that Perry Buckner was looking eastbound and 
looking for this motorcyclist? 
Of course, as I say, plaintiffs have turned 
this case around on its head, and that everything that 
happened was because of Perry Buckner. They want to start 
at the end of the collision and the death of Darin Kelson, 
and they want to blame everything that happened prior 
to that time on Perry Buckner. 
If Mr. Kelson had not speeded, he could not 
have collided with Perry Buckner. If Mr. Kelson had not 
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1 fled from peace officers, there wouldn't have been any 
2 | chase. And Perry Buckner would have had no reason to 
be assisting in some fashion in watching the progress 
of this chase. 
But oh, no, argued the plaintiffs. Everything 
that happened in this case happened because of the negligence 
of Perry Buckner. I would submit to you that there was 
no negligence on the part of Perry Buckner, and the fact 
8 I  that Mr. Buckner was unable to see a motorcyclist traveling 
g I at him at a high rate of speed was in fact the reason 
he pulled out in the path of this motorcyclist, which 
was an innocent mistake. It was not deliberate and intentional 
and it was not unlawful. We have had lots of discussions 
about what the law requires. Clearly all police vehicles 
or emergency vehicles pursuant to State law are required 
to sound sirens or make some other audible noise as reasonably 
necessary. And further, that emergency vehicles are required 
16 to be equipped with lights. 
However, State law also says that police vehicles 
do not have to display lights, do not have to be equipped 
with or display lights. So then the status of a police 
vehicle is that, at most, in order to drive in violation 
of any traffic laws or of any laws, all a police vehicle 
has to do, when engaged in an emergency, is sound a siren, 
if reasonably necessary. 
23 I Ladies and gentlemen, what would a siren have 
24 | done in this case, assuming that the intersection light 
was red? What good would this siren have done? How would 
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it have alerted Mr. Kelson to the danger ahead at the 
intersection? He had already heard — here is Mr. Kelson 
barreling along, arguably at speeds in excess of 76 miles 
an hour, and that bike was capable of 140 miles an hour. 
| So you have this individual on a highway driving 
a high powered motorcycle which can be very noisy. You 
know from the testimony which was elicited by the plaintiff 
that this individual was wearing a full shield, a full 
helmet shield. But they want you to believe that but 
for the failure to activate a siren at this intersection, 
that that accident would never have occurred. 
Mr. Kelson had two police vehicles chasing him, 
two police vehicles displaying lights, two police vehicles 
running sirens, but somehow this third siren at some location 
in front of Mr. Kelson was going to alert him to the danger 
at the intersection. 
Mr. Kelson, you know, because he was intoxicated, 
because he was fleeing from officers, he was still required 
to operate as a reasonable and prudent driver. He still 
|has an obligation under the Utah laws to not enter inter-
sections at excessive speeds. He was required to keep 
a proper lookout. 
I submit that he violated all of those laws 
in the course of his fleeing from these peace officers. 
That the only reason that his death occurred was because 
of his carelessness, because he was negligent, and because 
he was intoxicated. 
Perry Buckner just happened to be the individual 
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1 that was in the intersection upon the happening of this 
2 1 collision. It could have been someone else. I mean, 
letfs say that the light was green and Mr. Stromberg pulled 
out. And so you have Mr. Kelson driving up the road at 
a high rate of speed, and for some reason he turns over 
and he hits Mr. Stromberg. Well, Mr. Stromberg would 
be here in front of you. 
How do you know that some other individual might 
8 I  not have entered that intersection, other than defendant 
g I Buckner? You don't know. You don't know what risks there 
were. Those types of risks Mr. Kelson was chargeable 
with at the time he engaged in this unlawful activity. 
That he should have known and he should have appreciated 
that there could have been risks, as he fled from these 
police officers, and that he should have known that speeding 
— you know, it brings about problems, and speeding can 
15
 I  cause accidents . 
16 I He clearly should have known that speeding combined 
with intoxication can be fatal, and in fact was fatal. 
He should have known that someone could have been in the 
intersection. He had no reason to rely upon the fact 
that the light was red or green. There is a lot of controversy 
over the color of the light, but here Mr. Kelson is, and 
do you believe he was looking ahead, saying, oh, the light 
is green. I can go through the light and no one is going 
23 I to run into me? 
24 He wasn't thinking, ladies and gentlemen. The 
only thing he was concentrating on was managing that 
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motorcycle at a high rate of speed. You have heard the intox-
ication evidence. You know that his vision wasn!t impaired, 
and you know that his reasoning was impaired. You know 
that his hearing was impaired. You know that his manual 
dexterity was impaired. You know this man was operating 
a motorcycle when he was drunk. And yet you are supposed 
to believe that he couldn't have prevented this accident. 
It was his very course of conduct that resulted 
in this collision. That he is the person that undertook 
all those risks, that he is the person who put himself 
in that place and caused this chain of events. But for 
his actions on the night of March 13, 1984, nothing would 
have happened. The fact that Mr. Buckner may have been 
in the intersection is not the cause of the collision. 
The cause of the collision was the intoxication and irrespon-
sibility and negligent conduct of the deceased, which 
resulted in this collision, which resulted in his death. 
Counsel has made a point about the color of 
the light, but let me just say that, since this is my 
only opportunity, that the only person that gave any evidence 
at the time of the collision relative to the color of 
the light was Andrew Burton. And I invite you to examine 
(plaintiffs' Exhibit 19P — excuse me — that was Mr. Stromberg, 
There is an exhibit, and I won't bother to look for it, 
but look at Andrew Burton's statement. It was taken contem-
poraneously or shortly after this accident. I would submit 
that's the best evidence of what occurred. In that statement 
he says that the light was in favor of Buckner. 
1 1 
Counsel suggests to you that, oh, gee, Mr. Toone 
had all this wonderful information, and of course he went 
to see John T. Nielsen, and he told him what a jerk this 
cop was and what charges ought to be issued against Deputy 
Buckner. 
John T. Nielsen just couldnft issue charges 
against one of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Deputies. 
There was no evidence to support those claims, and there's 
no evidence to show that Mr, Nielsen conducted himself 
in less than a professional and responsible manner. He 
is the chief criminal deputy for Salt Lake County. 
And in any event, this so-called wonderful note, 
there is nothing contained within the notes that Officer . 
Toone gathered and gave to Mr. Nielsen that at any time 
indicated that Mr. Greer knew what color the light in 
the intersection was. Read the notes, read the exhibits. 
That is missing from any documents that were ever presented, 
and I just want to flash plaintiffs' Exhibit 7P, and I 
want to show you the work product of this professional 
peace officer, Officer Toone. This is Officer Toone's 
idea of professionalism in reporting. But he's just pro-
fessional, and that's one of his notes, and maybe you 
ought to look at plaintiffs' Exhibit 8P, Mr. Toone's notes 
again. 
He doesn't do any comprehensive reporting here. 
He doesn't put anything down that relates, but he comes 
in and tells you that Mr. Greer said, "Yes, the light 
was red." 
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1 There is no such such statement in the note 
2 relative to Mr. Greer's statement, Tropper Toone has 
misrepresented to you the testimony of the witnesses, 
that as he knew it at the time of the investigation, at 
the time he approached Mr. Nielsen for criminal charges. 
In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that Tropper 
Toone at any time tried to convince Mr. Nielsen there 
ought to be criminal charges. The only evidence before 
8 jl you is that Toone made a somewhat sloppy investigation 
g I of this matter, that he clearly developed some bias relative 
to defendant Buckner, that he did kind of a half-baked 
investigation. 
I mean, there is nothing stylish about his reports, 
and there is nothing thorough about his investigation. 
They hired him. He hired himself out so that he could 
be paid. So he investigates this as a highway patrol 
officer. He claims he's impartial, and yet he's been 
16 [I around this courtroom. You have seen him. He has sat 
17 in since he testified and was excused as a witness, listening 
to what was going on. 
Now, are those the actions of an unbiased and 
impartial person? I mean, what motivated Tropper Toone 
to come here and try and blame this accident on Perry 
Buckner. You tell me that any of the conclusions that 
he testified to are reasonable conclusions, conclusions 
23 |that a responsible accident reconstructionist or experienced 
24 I and responsible accident investigator would have arrived 
at. 
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Where does he get this 70-30 comparison of negligence^ 
He wants you to believe that Buckner, by reason of an 
innocent mistake, in that he did not see the motorcycle, 
he believed because of this dispatch communication that 
the motorcyclist was two blocks away from him, and he 
claims — he says the light changed green, he saw Mr, 
Stromberg, and he says that Bucknerfs actions in pulling 
into that intersection were negligent. He says that it 
was improper lookout. He tells you that he broke a red 
light. Mr. Toone wasn't at that accident. He doesn't 
know what went on. He just comes to court and tells you 
what's possible. He says he read so and so's statement, 
and he believes that to be the facts. He doesn't go out 
and time those lights, he didn't do anything. All he 
did was come to court and give you conjecture and say 
that this is who I blame and you ought to believe me because 
I'm such a great expert. He tells you that Mr. Stromberg 
says the light was red. That is a lie, ladies and gentlemen. 
Read the written statement that was given to the Sherifffs 
office at the time of the accident. Mr. Stromberg made 
no such statement. 
You saw Mr. Stromberg in court. Did he tell 
you the light was red at the time of the collision? No. 
Mr. Stromberg said he didn't know. But anyway, Toone 
keeps saying that gee, this occurred because I had all 
this unimpeachable evidence, and the light was red and 
Buckner is negligent. 
There was no such evidence to support those 
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conclusions. All he's done is torture the facts, whatever 
facts, and he twisted the testimony and manufactured this 
case. In fact, this case is based solely upon the testimony 
of Toone. 
I mean that every allegation, every assertion 
made by plaintiffs is based upon Trooper Toone, and Trooper 
Toone said this and Trooper Toone said that. 
Finallyf ladies and gentlemen, you are supposed to 
decide this evidence based upon the facts, exhibits, and 
you are supposed to decide based upon what you have seen 
here today. I submit that you ought not to listen and 
you ought to discredit any of the testimony put forth 
by Trooper Toone, that he is not impartial, that he is 
biased, and that he's been paid in this case and he became 
a paid expert and he is not objective. 
If he were so concerned about the failure to 
file criminal charges in this matter, why didn't he appeal 
it to a higher level? Whatever evidence is there that 
he did anything? He comes into court and he claims, well, 
he told John T. this and he told John T. that, and he 
suggests that — he doesn't outright, you know, testify 
that John T. just didn't listen to anything he had to 
say. 
There is no evidence of that, ladies and gentlemen. 
All he has done is try and take advantage. Mr. Nielsen 
comes to court and tells us that as part of his duties 
he reviewed the facts and circumstances and that he found 
there's no criminal negligence. And that to the best 
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1 of his recollection there are no problems with this case. 
2 I Is it because Mr. Toone isn't mentioned in John Nielsen's 
letter to Sheriff Hayward, wherein Mr. Nielsen sets forth 
his opinions and findings? Is it because Mr. Toone isn't 
mentioned in that letter that Mr. Toone is upset? Is 
he upset because Mr. Nielsen didn't say that because of 
the marvelous work of Officer Toone, that I reached my 
7 il 
conclusions? 
8 | What happened in this case, ladies and gentlemen? 
9 I That's for you to decide. This matter comes to the office, 
it goes out, there are no waves, then suddenly here's 
Mr. Toone. Of course, you see, Mr. Toone didn't think 
there was any 70-30 comparative negligence until after 
he was retained and paid by plaintiffs' counsel. But 
he continues to tell you that he's not biased. Of course 
today we came to court and he was recalled in rebuttal, 
and as you will recall, Mr. Christensen asked him, you 
16 A know, why he continued to be around the courtroom and 
17 why he was here, and he said it was because he was an 
interested party. 
This witness is confusing himself with the parties, 
He doesn't know about he's not a party to this lawsuit. 
The only parties are the plaintiffs and the defendants. 
He is just a witness, and now somehow he's become a party? 
If I could just go through quickly, I hope, 
23 I  you have heard all the evidence and I'm sure you're tired 
24 of all the evidence, but you will recall Kevin Judd. 
He was in the car with Perry Buckner, and the only thing 
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'. - -s salient relative to his test::-^v - • 
t. t:i le motorcycle just shortly before • .:;e • llision. 
" L course plaintiffs will say to you +-hat because 
-'-• ,"
 T
^1i & aw that mo tor eye] ^  "orTiiii-^  pi d I ikt thai, 
:. .* .. ^uckner should have seen it too. That's irrelevant 
in this case, .adies and gentlemen. You are not to itidqe 
Pf • *• : • . :.- ib I >'li,U I ' n "ill saw or" did. 
Tiicy a;- '.i * . - \:>e same plare* . . - don't know if wh.it-
Kevin T;.dd saw was w^*- ?^rr ""c'^er should 1M<I -r^n. 
TV . . • . . ' t see it , I'here 
is . evidence that shows F e r n B . :kner did see that 
._:i;*~::; -. ^ *.\_r h^ didn't see it, he 
should r v e seen i-. i.;t- w«- ": * -rove that he should 
haT~€> seen i _ :- - ; 
tn. notorcyc.L earner last *.;. : :: •* .* : •. -vr.ere. t/\at 
when Buckner a coked tr i *~na4 ' " - r~r~: k<=*- - wnen ci IPT 
the ,?.u,..,i;/. , ,.-j it least • v\ J I O C K S awa\ i rem *: ;ter-
section. 
- - - timonv saying +~hat ^^ 1 ^•*- ynn 
know ^hi^ *:: ese orricers - r*r ::o* v-.l.mg each ct* •• ;• "ibout 
the 1<* i* :^ * * -K.-^ -ra^e ^ wnat « • I'ln^ y 
art .J,( because tney could ^ave been • 
interrupting transmissions o e m g made by Wilden. :-^-
wou 1 : \ <- tieu u[ '' 1 ,'i -Hi' i i re 
.. .. .•.*+-- we 2 ] f geef may be, y oi i know, Judd was sitting 
in the a^e -'ir so maybe he should have told Buckner, 
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though Buckner would have been distracted from listening 
to the dispatch. You know, this whole incident occurred 
within two and a half minutes. You heard the tape, and 
the collision occurred long before the end of that tape. 
So you have a chase, a high speed chase, and it goes fast, 
and then this individual is dead. 
This isn't something that happened over a protracted 
period of time. If you read the written transcription 
of the tape it will suggest to you some time length. 
Ladies and gentlemen, you heard the trial, and you heard 
the copy of the dispatch time. You know this happened 
really quickly. So you have officers that are trying 
to assist the situation, they are listening, and they 
are figuring out, and Perry Buckner is sitting at that 
intersection relying upon what was being broadcast, and 
from the dispatcher he hears that this motorcyclist is 
two blocks away. And based upon that and the fact that 
he saw the light had changed to green, he crossed the 
intersection and Mr. Kelson ran into the patrol vehicle. 
Mr. Stromberg. I have already indicated to 
you that Mr. Stromberg came to court and he never testified 
as to the color of the light because he doesn't know. 
In his witness statement he enver offered an opinion as 
to the color of the light. He's been interviewed by lots 
of people, and he's never been sure. You saw him, and 
you say, was the light red? "Yes." Was the light Green? 
And he just goes back and forth. He doesn't know. 
And he's not real positive. You saw him. You make that 
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d e c i s i o n . 
What is J n he rest i no 'ibouf Mi, t inmbt'iij, he 
^-ims this intersection was very dark* So of course 
..t; -ji::'b st-c these * wo pol: 'e cars across from him until 
-~" \ i qht I'-" 11 1i e Mi, Greer
 f 
oct.-sed ...•, ..versecti )r, and Mr, Greer wants you to 
believe tha*- h<=> uos-r ved tb^se events in his rear vj.HW 
^ i nouqh Mr, Stromberg says 
that H A S .r/ersectio: was ery dark. 
Th^ • 1 -\ j -:*••: * s : 3 - t ha . M I I I >n I I % a v i, It 
tl .-is" : : i. A - loiT.ijer J C' ui :: ' • te 
across rv>- -street, *• * - :u;w .-ou! i "lr. < t - ^ r s a y ^r^_ :r 
the street wna > * 
Mr. S+-romberg,
 7v.. ,q.,t L; , o<. * -r. trie aucjraents that 
have ber-r: introduced iy~ \ la -*---• * ^ -- - - * "tatement, 
ar 
Jeff Greei > -r.e t. . r. - • r ^  strikes me ~ns r ibout 
his tP-1" imoY''" i - ^r v " • j; : ' *~ • * • ~ ; * ' r - : - : : 
K e 1 s<• „>11 " I,)eL"<J i.i se h i s t: r i e n d h a d a •. * c:" e n g a g i n g 
in high speed chases with police officers? When did he 
assume * • ^ * ese cops were alonq Hie • 
Da -, J And 1. ask you, I! repeat * you dgai::f 
1 that TooneV- notes ~; o\> r-' :. tdiratior. of what color t**3 
light was, accord:** 
So at t... ' J :• »r tr.a oi-er or Tocne completed 
his accident investiqa* - v. h< hadr.'- p!ic: v°i a** .^  .'-" 
testimo: ' : - r: . 
come in ,eic r,:vn ;^  * •.. Lestircr
 3no he's Jcne .-
19 
1 behalf of the plaintiffs. But he's biased in this case, 
2 that he's friendly with the plaintiffs and the family 
and he would like to see them recover some money. Further, 
that he was friendly with the deceased. So he's come 
and he's manufactured his testimony for the sole purpose 
of trying to convince you that you ought to award some 
money to this family. 
7 I 
| Talking about damages, of course, isn't our 
8 favorite subject, and I just want to point out to you 
g J) that we're not talking about an individual who was an 
astronaut or one of the Kennedys, we're talking about 
a young individual who had no substantial schooling, had 
a job, you know, for a short period of time at Hercules. 
Of course they will claim that he was going to work there 
forever. We would submit that if you made it a habit 
of going to work drunk, you probably could not retain 
your employment for very long. But that's what we're 
16 [I talking about, ladies and gentlemen. We're talking about 
17 the worth of individuals. And of course you know all 
individual lives have worth. That's not the point. The 
point is that if you should feel that damages are necessary, 
that the damages have to be reasonable, and you can't 
just award damages because you feel sorry for someone, 
that you have to do it reasonably. 
There's been a discussion also about percentage 
23 I  of negligence. Of course Deputy Probert said that he 
24 I felt that Mr. kelson was 100% negligent. And I would 
concur with that opinion. Look at the evidence. I mean, 
20 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
25 
all you have isMr. 3uckner wno :n:ortunate]y ou * I s '•';: 
xii front 01 * s -' ••- ~- ' r • , -. -- : * r.-_ * . 
you to find "Lat ue ^.s, you rin- -< - ' _- rcre responsible 
for pulling :t 1;. *r>* m t e r s e ^ r : r^ tr.an v r . Kelson was 
— * - - - . : ip: *r..- : «. ~:o.t point 
~ i.r.e. 
: course " ^ ] also war" f "live a mes -:*•?, I 
* . -. . .: * 1: fs won"! :* 1- .-u„ giT7e +-he message 
• :: . type case, and tney wan*" you to +~ell oeople that 
they can flee from officers, - n toiqage in ui. 1: dgeous 
a< , o e s , . ..t * h&\7 r-an a,_., ,0 o . ^ .gn /.-.eus, • :\c. 'an 
drive while intoxicated/ they can rur .rt - *< li'^ T-hides 
ana :;:.e\ can a * * -,. 
lawyers recover from tneir *• -vrongfu: deatr.. -.nd cnat's 
not the message this "Jury sr^ al'i sero Ima :r~* : :ut 
to send the n lessage ' . o -> - n was scit., responsible 
for his own death. .hit o '-' i: -"el son caused jr. :.s )wn 
death, and that Mr. and M r s , Kelson, while it's inn lud, 
th i,-,r.- wac caused by their soi.""s 
ow n o. -c^na:.*"4 f 
V * : -";
 f ladies ana g e i 1, base 3 i ip c i 1 11 ie 
ev , <•- know vmi h^;a that I know you are 
going *" . uoisider, you * re going ~ x h ok a*- ~r*- exhiiro" 
and recall the testirr: - - - , tn ts 
witnesses, by Perry Bu^Kner, an ^  A- aSK you t .; :;r:a ro 
cause of action. 
W- . - - • . .. . :, gence 
on behalf of Perry Buckner on March I 'i , 1984. We ask 
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you to find that the death of D arin Kelson was caused 
solely by the negligent actions of D arin Kelson. Thank 
you for your attention. 
(Further proceedings reported but not included 
in this partial transcript.) 
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